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Prepared* for the World Congress of 
Sociology at Varna, September 14-17, 1970
:
Opposing the conventional reliance on political sociological 
variables as too deterministic an explanation of political phe­
nomena, the author has taken a conceptual approach to the 
analysis of the breakdown of parliamentary democracy in 
Greece between 1965 and 1967. This approach emphasizes per­
sonal and volitional factors rather than broad structural and 
cultural determinants. [j. Chernoff]
On April 21, 1967, a bloodless coup d'état brought an 
end to parliamentary democracy in Greece. As had 
occurred so many times before in modern Greek 
history, a period of constitutional government was 
to be succeeded by military rule. Although the actual 
coup took nearly all observers by surprise, the crisis 
of Greek parliamentary democracy had long been too 
readily apparent. Indeed, the turbulence of the Greek 
political scene had become a kind of running story 
in the international press for close to two years pre­
ceding the eventual colonels’ junta.
Once the new military government demonstrated 
its staying powers, it was not long before a series of 
analyses appeared which attempted to explain the 
collapse of democracy in Greece. Across the ideo­
logical spectrum there was common agreement that 
the Greek parliamentary system was inherently unsta­
ble: the Right spoke of the threat of communist sub­
version; the Center of the machinations of the Pal­
ace; the Left of a reactionary regime masked by a 
parliamentary façade. Moreover, intellectual opin­
ion of various persuasions was especially prone to 
define Greek politics as completely subject to per­
fidious American influence. Even less passionate so­
cial analysts similarly stressed the formidable struc­
tural and cultural obstacles that blocked the develop­
ment of viable democratic forms in Greek society. 
Those looking at the lessons of history pointed to 
the repeated interventions of the military in the po­
litical life of twentieth-century Greece—eight coups 
counting the one in 1967. Social scientists variously 
documented the country’s socio-economic imbalances 
and its archaic personalistic politics. Commentators 
concerned with cultural variables placed great weight 
on the democratic incapacities of the Greek national 
character, and the artificiality of Western parliamen­
tary structures imposed on a Levantine society.
Thus both polemical and analytical accounts were 
typically in accord that the breakdown of Greek par­
liamentary democracy was in some sense inevitable, 
that the actors in the modern Greek drama were 
playing some kind of predetermined roles. Yet, 
these explanations of why democracy in Greece neces­
sarily failed are not entirely convincing.1 If we
* The research opportunity for this paper was made possible 
by a Ford Foundation Faculty Fellowship awarded for 1969-70, 
and a travel grant given by the Council for Intersocietal Studies, 
Northwestern University.
1. See Notes at the end of this article (p. 14).
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shift attention away from the operation of imperson­
al forces and toward the immediate political arena, 
a different kind of perspective is revealed. A leitmotif 
of this essay is that there was nothing inevitable 
about the collapse of Greek democracy from a struc­
tural or cultural standpoint.2 Rather, one must look 
to the particular circumstances which brought about 
the political crisis of 1965-67. It will be proposed that 
prior to the April 21 coup there were repeated in­
stances in which alternative steps could have averted 
the demise of the parliamentary regime.
Although the discussion to be given stresses the 
volitional aspects rather than the inexorable develop­
ments of Greek political life, it neither ignores the 
wants of broad segments of the population nor the 
social bases of political movements. But there is 
the premise that comprehension of the breakdown 
of a parliamentary democracy requires special aware­
ness of events occurring within a relatively confined 
political arena. Another premise is that the impact of 
external influences on the internal dynamics of Greek 
politics is fundamental but not all limiting. The charge 
that covert American intervention operated against 
parliamentary democracy in Greece is a serious one, 
and—to anticipate—has some substance in my judge­
ment. But to illuminate the role played by the United 
States must not obscure how Greek democracy was too 
often ill served by its elected and institutional leaders.
the Greek setting
The Greek War of Independence (1821-1829) was 
the beginning of the end of close to four centuries of 
Ottoman Turkish rule. That this revolution ultimate­
ly succeeded was due as much to the intervention of 
the major powers as it was to the indigeneous struggle 
of the Greek people. Despite their conflicting motives 
and cross purposes, a guarantee of an independent 
Greek kingdom was eventually agreed to by Great 
Britain, France, and Russia. The first monarch, Otho, 
a Bavarian prince, assumed the throne in 1833. The 
Greece of that period consisted of the Peloponnese, the 
southern portion of the Greek mainland (Roumeli and 
Attica), and certain nearby islands. Today this area is 
still known as «old Greece». Over the next century 
Greece expanded (through cessions from Great Brit­
ain, and wars with Turkey and Bulgaria) to include 
the Ionian Islands (1864), Thessaly (1881), Crete (de 
facto in 1898), Macedonia and Southern Epirus (1913), 
the Aegean Islands (1914), and Western Thrace (1919).
The incorporation of these territories dominated 
Greek political life and foreign affairs from the na­
tion’s inception until 1922. In that year Turkish forces 
inflicted a catastrophic defeat on the Greek Army 
in Asia Minor.3 In the wake of the débâcle over a 
million Anatolian and Istanbul Greeks fled to the
Greek mainland creating an immense influx of refu­
gees (close to one-quarter of the total Greek popula­
tion in 1925!) with profound consequences on the 
nation’s social and political life.
Although the Asia Minor disaster irrevocably shat­
tered the Greek Megali Idea of a resurrected Byzan­
tine Empire, Greece further expanded following World 
War II when the Dodecanese Islands were acquired 
from Italy in 1947. The issue of énosis (i.e. union) with 
Cyprus reappeared with special force in the 1950’s. 
Despite a compromise of sorts that led to the estab­
lishment of an independent Cyprus republic in 1960, 
the ultimate status of the island is still unsettled. 
Hopes to acquire «Northern Epirus» (in southern 
Albania) are also periodically raised, but the claim 
has not been pushed seriously in recent decades.
Returning to events on the domestic scene, Otho’s 
reign abruptly ended in 1862 with a bloodless coup. 
A new monarch, George I of the Danish House of 
Glücksborg, was enthroned in 1864. (Subsequent 
Greek monarchs have all been of the Danish dynasty.) 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a large 
migration from the countryside to the cities led to the 
growth of an urban bourgeoisie. This formed the 
social basis of a liberal political force which began 
to contest the old power holders made of the royal 
court, large landowners, and village notables. The 
latter part of the nineteenth century also saw the 
development of the modern Greek Army which was 
charged with pursuing Greece’s territorial expansion 
and policing its growing borders.
Dissatisfactions with the royal family, Greece’s 
financial difficulties, and impatience in acquiring 
«unredeemed» Greek territories culminated in a mil­
itary revolt in 1909. A group of reformist young of­
ficers summoned the Cretan leader, Eleutherios Ve- 
nizelos, to head the government. A new constitution 
was promulgated which reduced the powers of the 
monarchy and established a genuine parliamentary sys­
tem. In Greece’s first modern elections held in 1912, 
Venizelos’ Liberal Party won a resounding victory.
In 1913 George I was assassinated and his son, Con­
stantine I, succeeded to the throne. The new King and 
his Prime Minister quickly came to lead opposing 
political camps. Matters became aggravated with the 
outbreak of the First World War. Venizelos support­
ed the Allied cause while Constantine I’s German 
sympathies led him to advocate a neutralist policy 
for Greece. A confused situation developed which 
eventually ended with Constantine I leaving Greece 
in 1917. But the constitutional question of the King’s 
powers had become a major controversy in Greek 
politics, a situation which extends into the present.
Venizelos himself suffered an electoral defeat in 
1920. Constantine I was recalled to Greece only to 
be ousted again by a military coup in 1922. That same
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year George II, Constantine I’s son, ascended to 
the throne for an initial two-year reign. Another mili­
tary coup in 1924 abolished the monarchy entirely 
and transformed Greece into a republic. The repub­
lic, however, proved no more stable than the mon­
archy. Parliamentary elections and military regimes 
were interspersed with coup and counter-coup. In 
1935 the republic ended when George II was restored 
to the throne. In 1936 an outright military dictator­
ship was established under General loannis Metaxas 
with George II as titular head of state.
Metaxas achieved widespread support only shortly 
before his death when the Greek Army repulsed 
Italian invading forces in the winter of 1940. However, 
Greece was now in the Second World War. German 
forces quickly intervened and Greece was soon oc­
cupied by Axis powers. The Greek government was 
forced to flee to Egypt where—with strong British 
support—a government-in-exile was set up under 
George II. In Greece itself the Axis occupation, which 
lasted until the closing days of World War II, was 
particularly brutal and oppressive. Except for a small 
collaborating group, deprivation was massive through­
out Greece. Close to one-tenth of the population perish­
ed,over a half-million persons dying of starvation alone. 
During the war years contact between the exile govern­
ment and the situation in Greece was only sporadic.
Resistance groups formed early in the occupation 
period, the most successful by far being the commu­
nist-led National Liberation Front (EAM). EAM with 
its military arm, the National Popular Liberation Army 
(ELAS) gradually acquired effective control over 
most of the countryside. The political program of 
EAM /ELAS was based on vaguely socialistic lines 
some of which were implemented in the areas under 
its control. Concretely, EAM /ELAS was unwilling to 
back the return of the King and insisted on its right to 
maintain its armed forces into the post-war period. 
When German troops began to withdraw from Greece 
in late 1944, the latent hostility between the resistance 
forces and the government-in-exile broke into the open.
On the heels of the German evacuation, a govern­
ment of «National Unity»—in effect operating under 
British auspices—headed by /George Papandreou re­
turned to Athens. Whether EAM /ELAS sought to take 
power by force or not following the German evacua­
tion is still disputed. In any event, the Papandreou 
government’s attempt to dissolve EAM /ELAS led to 
armed conflict. In December 1944, British and Greek 
government forces drove EAM /ELAS from Athens. 
Despite an agreement between EAM /ELAS and the 
Greek government in early 1945, a period of «White 
Terror» ensued in which many members of commu­
nist partisan groups were detained, arrested, or kil­
led.4 Following a government-held plebescite, George 
II returned to Greece in 1946. A year later he died and
was succeeded to the throne by his brother, King Paul.
The Papandreou government itself had given way 
by early 1945 to a bewildering succession of cabinets. 
A state of political instability had begun which lasted 
into the early 1950’s. The conflict between government 
and communist forces which had temporarily abated 
broke out with even greater violence in 1946. For 
three more years Greece was to experience a Civil 
War whose devastation was in many ways even more 
severe than that suffered during the Second World 
War. Eventually the tide of battle turned against 
the communist insurgents. Two pivotal occurrences 
working against the communists were the 1947 Tru­
man Doctrine in which American military aid and 
advice replaced that of the British; and Tito’s closing 
of the Yugoslavian frontier to communist guerrilla 
units in 1949.5 By 1950 Greece was about to enter an 
unaccustomed era of peace, although political stabil­
ity was still elusive.
In both 1950 and 1951 national elections were held, 
but with inconclusive results. In less than two years 
some seven cabinets took brief turns at the helm of 
government. In the latter election, however, a new 
political group had emerged, the Greek Rally headed 
by Field Marshal Alexander Papagos. Although pro­
fessedly «non-political», the Greek Rally was a con­
servative force whose basic appeal lied in its promise 
to bring an end to political turmoil. In the 1952 elec­
tions, the Greek Rally won half of the popular vote 
and an overwhelming majority in the parliament. By 
the time of his death in 1955, the stern Papagos as 
Prime Minister had fulfilled his basic promise of 
bringing stability to Greece within the parliamentary 
framework. Nevertheless, this was gained at the ex­
pense of an internal economic policy which showed 
little improvement in the living conditions of the mass 
of the Greek population, and a foreign policy which 
moved Greece into even closer dependence on the USA.6
After the death of Papagos, King Paul appointed 
Constantine Karamanlis Prime Minister. Karamanlis 
dissolved parliament and formed his own conserva­
tive National Radical Union (ERE) to replace Papa­
gos’ Greek Rally. In elections held in 1956 ERE, 
while polling a minority of the popular vote was able, 
through a self-serving electoral system, to win a par­
liamentary majority. Subsequent elections in 1958 and 
1961 followed a similar pattern: ERE gaining popular 
pluralities along with decisive parliamentary majorities.
Although it appears undeniable that in 1958 and 
1961 ERE was genuinely polling substantially more 
votes than any other single opposition party, the fact 
remains that both these elections were marred by 
excessive strong-arm tactics on the part of government 
supporters. Indeed, the aura of a semi-police state 
could never be overcome during Karamanlis govern­
ments. In addition to electoral fraud and intimidation,
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there was the continued detention of communist 
prisoners and the government’s refusal to repatriate 
Greeks who took refuge in Eastern countries after 
the end of the Civil War. There was also evidence 
that the government was not always in control of its 
own agents. This was dramatically apparent in the 
murder of the left-wing deputy Gregorios Lambrakis 
in the spring of 1963, a killing for which senior po­
lice officials were culpable.
If the Karamanlis government was vulnerable in its 
practise of civil liberties, its performance on the eco­
nomic scene was more creditable. During the eight- 
year tenure of Karamanlis, the bases of a modern 
Greek economy were laid: large-scale public works 
were initiated and completed, Greek industry began to 
develop, the drachma became a sound currency, and 
Greece’s economic growth was impressive by all stand­
ard indicators. Yet despite improvements in living 
standards, problems persisted: resentment against con­
tinuing poverty grew, Greek workers by the hundreds 
of thousands sought employment in the factories of 
West Germany, the country’s trade balance contin­
ued to worsen, and foreign capital was introduced 
on what many considered unfavorable terms to Greece. 
On the foreign scene, the Karamanlis government kept 
Greece staunchly in the Western camp, although its 
NATO relations were strained by the growing viru­
lence of the Cyprus dispute. When acompromise agree­
ment gave Cyprus its independence in 1960, Kara­
manlis was put on the defensive by domestic opponents 
who accused him of betraying the enosist cause.
In June 1963, ostensibly following a minor dispute 
with King Paul, Karamanlis suddenly resigned ajid 
went into self-exile in Western Europe (where he 
has since remained). Confronting ERE in the ensuing 
electoral campaign was a newly invigorated Center 
Union headed by George Papandreou, still robust 
despite his 74 years. Elections held in late 1963 re­
sulted in a narrow parliamentary majority for the 
Center Union, thus giving the prime ministership 
to Papandreou. In February 1964 another election 
was held in which Papandreou’s Center Union won 
a resounding parliamentary majority and—even more 
impressive—an absolute popular majority. King Paul, 
stricken with cancer, lived only long enough to 
swear in the Papandreou government; he was suc­
ceeded by his 23-year-old son, Constantine II. It ap­
peared to many observers in the mid-1960’s that 
Greece was about to enter an era of both liberal 
progress and parliamentary stability.
Like the Karamanlis government, Papandreou was 
firmly oriented toward the West in international af­
fairs. But there were elements in the Center Union 
which were critical of Greece’s too close alignment 
with NATO and the United States. On the domestic 
front, the Center Union government took a more
lenient position toward communist prisoners, re­
negotiated contracts with foreign firms investing in 
Greece, substantially increased government expendi­
ture, and inaugurated major educational reforms. 
Despite the overdueness of the Papandreou policies, 
many experienced observers considered Papandreou 
more a firebrand opposition leader than a responsible 
prime minister in office. Not only were his adminis­
trative abilities in doubt, but he placed excessive 
emphasis on beating dead political horses and dig­
ging into old records to prove that ERE and Karaman­
lis were utterly corrupt. In many respects the Papan­
dreou government seemed to be squandering its im­
pressive political mandate on personal issues.
The political situation became increasingly tense 
and was compounded by personal conflict between 
Papandreou and Constantine II. But behind the ani­
mosity between Prime Minister and King lay deeper 
issues. Papandreou’s supporters saw him as a spokes­
man for progressive domestic change, a more in­
dependent foreign policy, closer scrutiny of foreign 
capital invested in Greece, and the architect of the 
dismantlement of police state agencies. For their part, 
opponents of Papandreou saw a demagogue who was 
initiating an unsound economic policy causing in­
flation and a weakening of the drachma; and who was 
unwittingly opening the way for a communist takeover 
by undermining the Greek political system through 
his personal attacks on the monarch.
All these issues became centralized in Papandreou’s 
efforts to bring the military under civilian control, 
or—depending on the viewpoint—to purge career 
Army officers. The Prime Minister made it govern­
ment policy to retire conservative-monarchist senior 
staff and command officers. Matters came to a head 
in May 1965 with the revelation of the so-called 
«Aspida» (Shield) affair. The military had uncovered 
within its own ranks an alleged conspiracy of left- 
wing junior officers. Implicated in «Aspida» was 
Andreas Papandreou, the Prime Minister’s son, and 
to many his father’s heir apparent in the Center 
Union. Whether to prevent its fabrication or to sup­
press evidence concerning his son’s activities, George 
Papandreou requested the resignation of his Defense 
Minister, Petros Garoufalias, so that he, the Prime 
Minister, could assume that portfolio and thereby 
control the «Aspida» investigation.
Whatever the Prime Minister’s motives, his demand 
provoked a constitutional crisis. Constantine II re­
fused to dismiss the pro-royalist Garoufalias who 
had originally been included in the Papandreou cabi­
net as a concession to the King. In a heated personal 
confrontation on July 15, 1965, George Papandreou 
stated to the King that only the prime minister had 
the right to decide the cabinet. Papandreou told the 
King he would resign the next day if he were not al­
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lowed to appoint himself minister of defense. The 
King took this verbal declaration as a formal res­
ignation and Papandreou was in effect dismissed 
from the government. It was from this moment that 
the beginning of the end of Greek parliamentary de­
mocracy can be dated. But before continuing the nar­
rative, the social bases and development of party 
politics in Greece requires an expository background.
parties and politics
Despite the instability of the Greek political sys­
tem, there has been a rather surprising durability in 
Greece’s major political formations over the past 
half century. One can meaningfully speak—albeit 
with some arbitrariness—of Right, Center, and 
Left in Greek politics. Although party names and 
leaders changed over time, although often charac­
terized by internal feuding and breakaway factions, 
each of these three groupings tended to take more or 
less different stands on such issues as the monarchy, 
foreign policy, and the nature and degree of domestic 
social reform. Moreover, although not as closely 
linked to identifiable social bases as is found in most 
Western European societies, each of these political 
groupings had discernable differences in the sources 
of their popular support.
The Center in Greece derives from the Liberal 
Party founded by Eleutherios Venizelos in 1912. From 
its inception, the Liberals were critical of the mon­
archy, though its leader was never truly republican. 
Originally articulating the interests of the new bour­
geoisie and white-collar workers, the Liberals also 
drew heavily from the refugees who arrived in Greece 
following the 1922 Asia Minor disaster. It was also 
under Venizelos that the expropriation of large estates 
was begun thereby creating an independent peasantry 
in Greece. Regionally, the Liberals polled best in the 
newly acquired Greek territories and Venizelos’ home 
island of Crete.
The Right as a distinctive political grouping was 
largely engendered in response to the cohesiveness 
of the Liberals. Supporters of Constantine I banded 
together in what became known as the Popular Party 
or Populists. Pro-royalist, anti-Venizelos, and extreme­
ly traditional on social issues, the Populists became 
the leading conservative force in Greek politics. The 
Populists tended to find the bases of their support 
among the traditionally oriented peasantry especially 
in the regions of «old Greece».
While bitterly hostile to each other and opposed 
on significant issues, the Liberals and the Populists 
shared much in common. Both parties centered on 
and were dominated by the personalities of their 
leaders. Moreover, both of their political organiza­
tions were based on «patron-client» relationships.
The loyalty of the peasant voter was determined by 
his allegiance to a locally prominent person who 
in turn depended on a national party leader for 
patronage and official prestige. In practical terms, 
this meant the local party figure would act as an 
intermediary between the peasant and the other­
wise impersonal bureaucracy. In many cases, this 
relationship fostered surrogate kinship ties through 
the koumbaros role, i.e. the patron becoming his 
client’s best man and /or godfather of his client’s 
children. Although this web of personal allegiances 
was most typically a rural phenomenon, it existed in 
cities as well. Indeed, the patron-client relationship has 
been a prevailing feature of Greek political life from 
the War of Independence into the contemporary period.
Differing from both of the «bourgeois parties» 
was the Greek Communist Party (KKE). Emerging 
as a small political organization in the wake of the 
Russian Bolshevik Revolution, the KKE at first ap­
pealed to a small number of middle-class intellectuals. 
Through the 1920’s it began to make inroads among 
refugees from Asia Minor and—through labor union 
activity—industrial workers (particularly in Thes­
saloniki). Both on ideological grounds and because 
it had little largesse to distribute, the KKE eschewed 
the traditional patron-client mode of Greek political 
organization. The KKE was always handicapped by 
its failure to make headway in the countryside, the 
smallness of the country’s proletariat, and by severe 
internal fights over personalities and issues of tac­
tics. Nevertheless, by the mid-1930’s the KKE had 
made impressive gains in parliamentary elections 
and was becoming a force to be reckoned with in 
Greek politics.
The establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship in 
1936 brought a halt to all democratic political ac­
tivity. It was not until after World War II that par­
liamentary politics was to resume. During the Second 
World War, the Liberals and the Populists continued 
their feuds in the government-in-exile; while in oc­
cupied Greece the KKE became the dominating force 
in the EAM /ELAS resistance. With the outbreak of 
the Civil War the KKE was driven underground; 
it has remained illegal in Greece since 1947. During 
the Civil War period the government leaders were 
variously chosen from Liberal and Populist factions.
The advent of the 1950’s saw a return to the 
«normal» politics of Greece. Despite the sweeping 
events and catastrophic wars of the preceding decade 
and a half, the three major political formations of 
Right, Center, and Left were resumed in only slightly 
altered form. The conservative Populists gave way 
to Papagos’ Greek Rally (1951) which in turn was 
replaced by ERE founded by Karamanlis (1956) and 
later headed by Panayotis Kanellopoulos (1963). 
Another right-wing party, though a minor one, was
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the Progressives, a personal vehicle of Spiros Mar- 
kezinis.7 Although usually closely allied with ERE, 
Markezinis’ group maintained its separate parlia­
mentary identity.
For a period in the early 1950’s the center spectrum 
of Greek politics was shared by three parties: the 
Liberals continuing under their old label, now headed 
by Sophoklis Venizelos, the son of Eleutherios Veni- 
zelos; a personal party of George Papandreou who 
had lost a leadership struggle within the Liberals to 
the younger Papandreou; and the National Progres­
sive Union of the Center (EPEK) founded by General 
Nicolaos Plastiras, a well-known republican since the 
1920’s.8 Toward the end of the decade the political 
scene had become even more fragmented with nine 
different centerist parties taking part in the 1958 
elections. The two major centerist groups, however, 
remained those respectively headed by Papandreou 
and Venizelos fils. (Plastiras’ EPEK having died 
with its leader in 1953.)
Although differences of issue were minimal among 
the numerous centerist parties, each was dominated 
by the desire of its leader for personal authority. 
But on the common impulse to break the power of 
ERE, George Papandreou succeeded in 1961 in unit­
ing a single Center Union. This process in political 
fusion temporarily overcame the individual ambitions 
of the various political personalities involved. Though 
losing the 1961 elections, Papandreou maintained the 
Center Union’s solidarity by mounting a furious and 
persistent attack on the legitimacy and morality of 
ERE. In this endeavor Papandreou was able to ex­
ploit mass protests and virulent press criticism of the 
government. Under the pressure of Papandreou’s 
«relentless struggle», an atmosphere of crisis was 
created with which the ERE government was unable 
to cope. As a result of elections held in 1963, the 
Center Union won a narrow plurality and Papan­
dreou became Prime Minister. George Papandreou’s 
hold on the leadership of the Greek Center seemed 
confirmed by his party’s landslide electoral victory in 
February 1964. (Papandreou’s long-time Liberal rival 
Sophoklis Venizelos had died several weeks earlier.)
Much as the old Populists were succeeded by ERE, 
and as the Liberals had their lineal descendant in the 
Center Union, the Left also reappeared as an integral 
political force in Greek society. The outlawed KKE 
played a central—if not always clear—role in the 
formation of the United Democratic Front (EDA) 
which has taken part in every Greek election since 
1951. Although strongly communist influenced, EDA 
had always included many persons who were not 
communists but who for one reason or another op­
posed the status quo. Among the factors underlying 
EDA’s appeal were: families of Civil War prisoners 
and exiles desiring clemency and repatriation for their
relatives; disgust with the maneuverings of old-line 
politicians and parties; and opposition to Greece’s 
foreign policy, especially its NATO membership and 
handling of the Cyprus question. Much of EDA’s 
grass-roots support was due to its organizational 
links with leftist labor unions and youth groups.
Thus, by the middle 1960’s, the three distinctive 
political formations were very reminiscent of Greek 
politics over a generation back. There were even 
persistent similarities in the support given by dif­
ferent sectors of the population to the contemporary 
parties of the Right, Center, and Left. ERE was more 
the party of owners of shops and businesses and, es­
pecially in «old Greece», of farmers. The Center 
Union drew more from the salaried employees and 
civil servants, and the rural regions which had been 
the stronghold of the elder Venizelos. EDA found its 
basic support among discontented intellectuals, indus­
trial laborers, and lower-paid service employees, par­
ticularly among the families of Asia Minor refugees.
Although there were these discernable differences 
in their social bases of support, both ERE and the 
Center Union—like their Populist and Liberal pre­
decessors—were fundamentally similar in their 
organization. The mass support of both the ERE 
and Center Union was based on a web of patron- 
client and kinship relations to local political figures 
which crisscrossed social strata. Moreover, ERE 
and the Center Union were both run with a total 
disregard of internal democracy; Papandreou ran 
the Center Union as autocratically as had Karamanlis 
the ERE. Unlike the bourgeois parties of the Right 
and Center, EDA—like the KKE in the 1930’s— 
possessed a formal organization independent of 
patronage ties, and a cadre selected on the basis of 
party loyalty rather than personal influence. Like­
wise, EDA’s parliamentary representation was issue 
oriented and not just a collection of special pleas.
Given in the Table are the percentages of popular 
votes and parliamentary seats in Greek elections since 
1952. Because of the workings of the electoral system 
there was often a lack of correspondence between
Percentages of Popular Vote by Political Groupings in 
Greek Elections, 1952-1964. (Corresponding percentages of 








1952 50 (82) 35 (17) 10(-) 5 ( 1)
1956 50 (55) 48 (44)* 2( 1)
1958 44 (58) 31 (16) 25 (26) —
1961 50 (58) 34 (34) 15 ( 8) K-)
1963 43 (45) 42 (46) 15 ( 9) • —
1964 35 (35) 53 (58) 12 ( 7) —
* The Center and Left ran in electoral coalition in 1956; separate 
party totals are not available.
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the popular vote and parliamentary representation.9 
For twelve years (1952-1963) the Right maintained a 
decisive parliamentary majority with a popular vote 
of between 44 and 50 percent. During this period of 
conservative supremacy, the major opposition group 
was found in the Center (although an electoral quirk 
in 1958 gave the Left the second largest parliamentary 
representation in 1958).
The political picture changed fundamentally in 1963 
when the Center gained the ascendancy and ERE 
became the opposition party. In the last elections held 
in 1964, the parliamentary breakdown out of a total 
of 300 deputies was: Center Union, 173 seats; ERE, 
98 seats; Markezinis’ Progressives in coalition with 
ERE, 7 seats; and EDA, 22 seats. This was the party 
distribution in parliament at the time of Papan- 
dreou’s confrontation with the King on July 15, 1965.
constitutional crisis: 1965-67
Following the «resignation» or «dismissal» of George 
Papandreou, Constantine II sought to form another 
government without resorting to new elections. The 
King’s strategy was to select a prime minister from 
within Papandreou’s own Center Union. Within an 
hour of Papandreou’s resignation (thus giving cre­
dence to speculation that the Palace had pre-planned 
Papandreou’s dismissal), Constantine II charged 
George Athanasiades-Novas with forming a new 
government. Athanasiades-Novas, a middle-of-the- 
road Center Union leader and President of the Par­
liament, accepted the commission but was able to 
muster only twenty supporters from his own party. 
Even with the parliamentary votes of ERE and 
Markezinis’ Progressives this was not enough. The 
King next turned to the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Stephanos Stephanopoulos, who came from the con­
servative side of the Center Union. Stephanopoulos 
agreed to accept the mandate if the Center Union 
caucus approved. The caucus, still loyal to Papan­
dreou, refused his request. On the third try, the King 
went to the Center Union’s left and selected the 
moderate socialist leader, Elias Tsirimokos. Although 
this attempt gained some support within the Center 
Union, it too failed when the Progressives declined 
to vote for a left-wing prime minister backed by the 
right-wing ERE.
Finally, on September 24, 1965, —over two months 
since Papandreou’s resignation /dismissal—a cabi­
net was formed. The head of the new government 
was Stephanopoulos, who with other Center Union 
deputies had by then openly broken with Papandreou. 
The Stephanopoulos government was voted in with 
the slimmest of majorities, 152 in favor and 148 
against. The opposition was made up of the 126 
Center Union deputies remaining loyal to Papandreou
and the 22 EDA votes. The vote in favor of the new 
government consisted of 105 ERE and Progressive 
deputies and 47 breakaway Center Union deputies. 
However, only the Center Union dissidents formed 
the actual government!
The severance of the defecting deputies from the 
Center Union—quickly labeled the «apostates»— 
required either a strong sense of courage or greed, 
depending on the viewpoint. Along with accusations 
of acceptance of bribes, the fact remains that each 
and every one of the Center Union defectors became 
a minister in the new government with attendant 
privileges of patronage and influence. For their part, 
the Center Union dissidents claimed their numbers 
would have been greater had it not been for fear of 
reprisals including threats of death. In any event, 
believing their position would be strengthened by 
organizing themselves as a new party, the Center 
Union defectors—eventually 45 deputies—formed 
themselves into the Liberal Democratic Center (FDK) 
in the early summer of 1966. FDK, however, always 
remained a political anomaly: a splinter party from 
the former government party being kept in power 
by the former opposition.
In the meantime the ouster of George Papandreou 
had become a full-blown constitutional crisis. Under 
the 1952 Constitution the monarch had the right to 
appoint his ministers subject to a vote of confidence. 
Further, there was no constitutional doubt that the 
King need necessarily select the leader of the largest 
political party for prime minister.10 Where the Con­
stitution was unclear, however, was whether the 
monarch must call new elections in the event of 
dismissing a government—such as Papandreou’s— 
which had received a vote of confidence and had 
never been overridden by a vote of no-confidence. 
Papandreou insisted that if the King did not reap­
point him, Parliament therefore must be dissolved. 
This would entail, according to the Constitution, the 
holding of new parliamentary elections within 45 
days after dissolution, and the convocation of the 
new parliament within three months. Constantine II 
had every reason to fear that parliamentary elections 
might well turn into an unfavorable plebiscite on the 
monarchy itself. Thus, the King sought to use the 
vagueness of the Constitution both to keep Papan­
dreou out of the prime ministership and not to call 
new elections. By undercutting Papandreou within 
his own party and forming a government from a 
Center Union faction, the King’s efforts were suc­
cessful—albeit in a pyrrhic sense, only.
With the installation of Stephanopoulos as prime 
minister and the formal creation of FDK, the King 
undoubtedly hoped the governmental interregnum 
was over. In fact, the Stephanopoulos government did 
surprise most observers by displaying some stay-in
9
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power and even passing some major legislation. 
Yet, while Papandreou’s hold on the Center Union 
declined in Parliament, his popularity continued great 
in the country at large. With an upsurge of popular 
sentiment behind him, Papandreou did not hesitate 
to encourage strikes and street demonstrations in his 
behalf. The Left, which was in common cause with 
Papandreou’s demands for new elections, took what 
advantage it could during this period of widespread 
political indignation. Although EDA was more a 
participant rather than an engineer of the pro- 
Papandreou demonstrations, their presence was suf­
ficient to alarm the Right, the Palace, and the military 
hierarchy. Speculation about an imminent coup 
d'état became increasingly common. By the end of 
1966 events had escalated from an imbroglio between 
Papandreou and Constantine II to a major constitu­
tional dispute to a crise de régime.
Moreover, by the end of 1966, the ERE became 
restive in the role of supporting a government in 
which they were not represented. The ERE leader, 
Kanellopoulos, also believed his party might do well 
at the polls after all; a reaction against the turmoil 
of the past 18 months was beginning to be evident. 
With ERE withdrawing its votes from the FDK 
government, Stephanopoulos resigned as prime min­
ister on December 23, 1966. The next day an interim 
non-political government, receiving the support of 
both ERE and the Center Union, was sworn in with 
the sole mandate of holding elections six months 
hence. The new caretaker prime minister was Ioannis 
Paraskevopoulos, governor of the Bank of Greece and 
a man respected for his impartiality.
Before the Center Union gave its votes to the Pa­
raskevopoulos government, however, a short-lived 
dispute flared between the Papandreous, father 
and son. The left caucus of the Center Union led by 
Andreas Papandreou (and accounting for about one- 
quarter of the Center Union deputies) viewed the 
election proposal as a Palace bid for the support of 
the conservative wing of the Center Union.11 Never­
theless, the senior Papandreou’s will to hold elections 
—and presumably resume the prime ministership 
in the new parliament—prevailed; the entire Center 
Union gave its votes çf confidence to the interim 
government. Opposing the Paraskevopoulos govern­
ment were only FDK and EDA, both of whom feared 
the elections would be held under an electoral system 
handicapping their «minor» parties.
In late March 1967, the case of Andreas Papandreou 
and the «Aspida» affair were again the occasion of 
a new crisis. The State Prosecutor requested the 
parliamentary immunity of Andreas Papandreou 
(who was now alleged to be the civilian leader of the 
military conspiracy) be lifted. Although there was no 
likelihood Parliament would revoke the immunity of
10
one of its members, a more serious problem existed. 
According to the Constitution, the parliamentary 
immunity of a deputy extended for only 30 days 
after the dissolution of parliament while elections 
could be held as late as 45 days after dissolution. 
In practical terms this meant there was a 15-day 
interval in which Andreas Papandreou could be ar­
rested. The Center Union responded by seeking to 
extend the immunity of a deputy for the whole period 
between the dissolution of Parliament and new elec­
tions. Kanellopoulos and ERE rejected this as un­
constitutional. A compromise that Paraskevopoulos 
would personally guarantee no arrests would be made 
before the elections was not acceptable to the Center 
Union. On March 30, 1967, the Paraskevopoulos 
caretaker government fell.
By this time the possible combinations to form a 
government were becoming exhausted. Events out­
side of Parliament were also heating up again with 
a wave of violent demonstrations, student riots, and 
strikes. On April 2 Constantine II made an indirect 
offer to George Papandreou to form an all-party 
government which was turned down. The King next 
turned to Kanellopoulos and asked him to form a 
minority ERE government; hopefully by luring small- 
party support with the promise of an electoral sys­
tem based on straight proportional representation. 
Despite several days of intensive negotiation, Kanel­
lopoulos’ efforts were unavailing. Parliament was 
dissolved on April 14 and elections called for May 
28. Most observers predicted a victory for the Center 
Union, although some thought George Papandreou’s 
popular support was eroding.
The elections never took place.
the end of a regime
The Military Takes Over. Throughout 1966 and es­
pecially during the final political crisis in the spring 
of 1967, rumors abounded of an imminent military 
coup d'état. Informed speculation had it that the 
King and very senior military officers would inter­
vene to prevent elections which might turn into an 
anti-royalist referendum. But when the coup did come 
in the early hours of April 21, 1967, it was master­
minded by a group of relatively unknown colonels. Com­
mentators subsequently surmised that the colonel’s 
coup had beaten the King’s coup to the punch— 
much to the unwitting surprise of the Palace.
The leaders of the junta were not the kind of per­
sons privy to the confidences of the Palace. And, 
as later events proved, their loyalty to the King was 
very conditional. Nor was the junta in accord with 
the politikos kosmos—that circle of sophisticated 
Athenians of various ideological persuasions who 
long dominated the arts, professions, academica,
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and press in Greece as well as its politics. In contrast 
to the politikos kosmos, the junta were austere 
products of the provincial petty bourgeoisie who 
strongly valued the traditional morals of Greek com­
munity life. They were practising Christian Greek 
Orthodox, many of whom were under the influence 
of «Zoi», a lay religious organization devoted to 
evangelic education directed toward youth. Indeed, 
the colonels’ junta seemed to display almost as much 
resentment toward the moral laxities and prerogatives 
of the Athenian upper class as it did toward the sub­
version of the communists.12
But whatever social distinctions can be made 
between the putative King’s coup and the actual 
colonels’ coup—and they are meaningful, the fact 
remains that it was a military regime which displaced 
the constitutional parliamentary government. From 
its viewpoint, the military had good reason to fear 
another George Papandreou government (and even 
more so one headed by Andreas Papandreou). Under 
the preceding Papandreou government, military ex­
penditures had been reduced and it could be assumed 
that further cuts in the military budget were in the 
offing in the event of another Center Union govern­
ment. Moreover, if Greece adopted an anti-NATO 
stance, the very raison d'être of the military was 
threatened. There was also the significant fact—over­
looked by most observers of the Greek scene—that the 
pay scale of military officers had severely lagged behind 
civilian rates during the 1964-66 inflationary period.
But, most important, George Papandreou when 
prime minister had announced his intentions to Par­
liament to retire officers of doubtful loyalty to his 
government. From the conventional liberal perspec­
tive this could be interpreted as an effort to bring the 
military under civilian control. But from the Army’s 
standpoint, the Papandreou proposals would destroy 
the integrity of the officer corps based on a con­
servative political homogeneity which went as far back 
as the Metaxas dictatorship and was confirmed during 
the years of the Civil War. Left and Center elements 
may have correctly felt that the armed forces had 
become a «parallel state» requiring depoliticization. The 
military saw this as repoliticization and a provocation 
to its basic institutional integrity. It were these issues 
which gave the «Aspida» affair such significance.13
The fact that the colonels had used a NATO plan 
of operation to execute their coup was frequently given 
as prima facie evidence of American complicity.14 
Left and Center spokesmen (and after Constantine 
II’s exile in December 1967, those of the Right as 
well) asserted that the military takeover could only 
have been undertaken with, at the least, American 
acquiescence, or with, more probably, active American 
involvement. There was no denying that the Greek 
military was closely locked into broader American
strategy and that the armed forces were dependent 
on the United States for material support. Thus it 
would seem eminently plausible that if the United 
States saw its interests endangered in Greece, it 
would take steps to avert such an eventuality. There 
was also the realpolitik factor that from the time of the 
Yalta Agreements, the Russians have tacitly accepted 
Greece’s inclusion in the Western sphere of influence, 
first under the British and later the Americans.
It is certainly a cardinal tenet of Greek political 
culture that nothing of importance can happen in 
Greece without the approval of the United States. 
And it was manifestly evident that since the Truman 
Doctrine, American influence was omnipresent on 
the Greek political scene. There was the Civil War 
which the government won with the help of American 
military advisors and weapons. In 1950 the United 
States was instrumental in bringing about a govern­
mental coalition which led Greece into NATO. In 
1952 the United States insisted on changes in the 
electroral system which favored Papagos’ Greek 
Rally. During the Karamanlis years, ERE was 
considered the «American Party» (in much the same 
way as EDA was the «Russian Party»). In the 
early 1960’s, the Kennedy Administration indicated 
it would support a more liberal government thus 
fostering the rise of the Center Union. (Ironically 
enough, Andreas Papandreou was accused in his 
early political career of being an American agent.)
Although the full circumstances of America’s role 
in the 1967 military takeover may never be known, 
the probability is that Americans in official capacities 
were ready to go along with a King’s coup, but that 
the actual colonels’ coup caught the United States 
government unaware. It should also not be over­
looked that the official American presence in Greece 
was many faceted (the Embassy, the Military Mis­
sion, CIA, and AID) and often at cross-purposes. 
A balanced understanding of the breakdown of de­
mocracy in Greece must be wary of the lure of a 
too easy causal emphasis on the American role. 
Such an oversimplified interpretation can only serve 
to cloud analysis by ignoring the inherent failures 
of the Greek political system and its ruling class. 
As a trenchant critic of the United States role in 
Greece has written: «It is of course ridiculous to 
maintain that the dictatorship was purely a product 
of US intervention.»15
The Erosion of Legitimacy. According to the junta 
leaders, the immediate trigger of the April 21 coup 
was the need to prevent disorder and bloodshed at 
a Center Union rally planned for Palm Sunday at 
Thessaloniki. In the military’s mind the accelerated 
tempo of domestic unrest in the middle 1960’s was 
cause enough to move the armed forces from a pos-
11
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ture of watchful apprehension to one of direct mil­
itary intervention. Although the military’s rationale 
was undoubtedly self-serving, the undermining of 
public order was one of the root causes in breakdown 
of Greek constitutional government. Any adequate ex­
planation of the erosion of the legitimacy of the par­
liamentary system must emphasize the telling effects 
of promoting political goals through extra-parliamen­
tary means.
Following his ouster from the prime ministership, 
George Papandreou exploited domestic turmoil on 
a scale new to Greek urban politics. Strikes were 
generally in those sectors of the working population 
where Center Union strength was greatest: civil 
servants, bank employees, postal workers, teachers, 
hospital staff, and telecommunication technicians.16 
It was only in the spring of 1967 that EDA-influenced 
unions (notably construction workers) began to take 
a major part in the labor unrest. More ominous was 
the Center Union’s propensity to organize mass pub­
lic demonstrations in which violence always lurked 
in the wings. One of the most impressive of such 
demonstrations was on July 15,1966—the anniversary 
of Papandreou’s removal from government. Scores 
of thousands of Center Union supporters passed in 
motorcade before the balcony of Papandreou’s house 
in an intimidating display of mass solidarity.
It must be reiterated, however, that the exploitation 
of extra-parliamentary force was not introduced into 
Greek politics by the Center Union. The period of 
«stability» during the Karamanlis regime featured the 
thugery of the notorious Civil Guard which helped 
bring in ERE majorities in rural areas. The murder 
of Lambrakis in 1963 was the most dramatic, but 
only one instance of right-wing political repression. 
All segments of the Greek political spectrum (but, 
perhaps, the EDA least of all) were too quick to use 
extra-legal means to advance their sectarian causes. 
In this sense, the military takeover did not deviate 
all that much from the practises of erstwhile parlia­
mentary leaders.
Exasperating the fundamental problem of public 
order were other factors undercutting the legitimacy 
of Greek constitutional government. During the par­
liamentary crisis of 1965-67, the trials of both the 
«Aspida» conspirators and the Lambrakis’ murderers 
were going on. Accusations were made of fabrication 
or suppression of evidence along with the implication 
of high personages not on trial. The likelihood of 
obtaining due process of law within established pro­
cedures was now brought into public question. Its 
impartiality questioned, the prestige of the legal sys­
tem was severely diminished, and with it that of the 
entire political framework.
Through an unfortunate coincidence in time, the 
Greek Orthodox Church was also exposed to sweep­
ing scandals during the same period. The unseemly 
ambitions of bishops seeking transfers from poor to 
rich dioceses became publically known and received 
extensive press coverage. Matters were not helped by 
allegations of homosexuality within the Church hier­
archy, including the newly appointed primate of 
Greece (he resigned and was eventually exonerated). 
Although the Church scandals were unrelated to the 
contemporaneous political drama, the tarnishing of 
such a central institution in Greek society could only 
contribute to a general malaise toward the existing 
state of affairs.
Another factor having debilitating consequences 
on the legitimacy of the parliamentary system revolved 
around bureaucratic arrogance. By the time of the 
1967 coup, the Greek civil service itself had become 
an object of widespread resentment. Although docu­
mentation is elusive, the excruciating passage of an 
individual through a circuit of officious civil serv­
ants was an affront which nearly all of the adult 
population had shared. Encumbered by efforts to 
maintain social distance and overlegalistic interpreta­
tions of regulations, the civil bureaucracy played a 
not insignificant role in the general disgust with 
things governmental. Certainly a listing of prime 
factors which undermined the Greek political system 
must prominently include the alienation of its citi­
zenry from the channels of government with which 
they dealt directly.
Personalities and the Parliamentary Failure. Ulti­
mately one returns to the personalities involved in the 
breakdown of Greek parliamentary democracy. As 
head of state it is hard not to fault Constantine II 
for a series of grievous errors. Although staying within 
the letter of the Constitution, the young King almost 
unfailingly compounded one political miscalculation 
after another: (1) his too quick—and probably 
preplanned—acceptance of Papandreou’s «resigna­
tion» in July 1965; (2) his creation—through cynical 
offers of power—of an ersatz parliamentary party 
from Center Union dissidents (FDK) in September 
1965; (3) his abandonment of FDK by bringing 
about the Center Union-ERE agreement resulting 
in the Paraskevopoulos government in December 
1966; his efforts to install a minority ERE govern­
ment following the fall of the Paraskevopoulos 
government in April 1967. During all these maneu- 
verings the King displayed an inexperience in the give 
and take of parliamentary processes, an insensitivity 
to what was happening to the political climate in the 
country at large, and a basic incomprehension of the 
nature of democratic politics.17
But Constantine II’s political failings were not alone 
in contributing to the collapse of the Greek par­
liamentary system. The King’s poor judgement was
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matched by the intemperateness of his bête noire, 
George Papandreou. During 1961-63, Papandreou 
kept the Center Union together as an opposition 
party by embarking on a campaign of «relentless 
struggle» against ERE. Originally focusing on the 
intimidations of the 1961 elections, Papandreou’s 
attack eventually came to castigate the government 
as utterly evil in every respect. When Prime Minister 
himself (1963-65) an inordinate amount of time and 
energy was spent in unearthing old political scandals 
and capitalizing on past ERE misdeeds. Following 
his ouster as prime minister, Papandreou began a 
second «relentless struggle» (1965-67), this time with 
the added ingredient of mass protest. Although much 
of Papandreou’s fiery rhetoric could be dismissed 
by the cognoscenti as only personal style, his root 
attack on the nature of party politics was accepted 
at face value by many Greeks.
The parliamentary personages who figured so 
prominently in contemporary Greek politics were 
by and large products and maintainers of the tra­
ditional party system based on patron-client relation­
ships. Unbeholden to consistent party identities or 
organizational loyalties, they formed and reformed 
whatever short-term alliances would advance their 
individual careers. A resume of the political fluctu­
ations of George Papandreou is indicative of the 
general pattern. In the early decades of the century 
Papandreou is associated with Eleutherios Venizelos’ 
Liberals. In 1933 he sets up his own «socialist» 
(actually centerist-republican) party. In 1936 he runs 
as a member of a regional party. In late 1944 he is 
the anti-communist prime minister heading a pro­
royalist government of «National Unity». In 1946 
he is part of a center-right coalition. In 1950 and 
1951 he immodestly heads the «George Papandreou 
Party». In 1952 he enters parliament as a member 
of the rightist Greek Rally. In 1956 he joins his center 
party in electoral coalition with the leftist EDA. 
In 1958 he is back under the Liberal banner sharing 
leadership with Sophoklis Venizelos. In 1961 he 
forms and heads the Center Union. In 1965 he is 
moving toward a de facto coalition with EDA. In 
late 1966 Papandreou is in parliamentary alliance 
with the Right in support of the Paraskevopoulos 
government. With such a political lineage, it is little 
wonder George Papandreou’s credentials as a re­
sponsible political leader could be held in question.
Unlike his father, Andreas Papandreou genuinely 
departed from the old-line personalistic politics. The 
younger Papandreou had returned to Greece from 
America in 1959 at the invitation of Karamanlis to 
establish a semi-governmental institute of economic 
research. In the United States he had been an aca­
demic economist of some distinction. As George Pa­
pandreou’s political fortunes improved, the son be­
came active in the Center Union and (after relinquish­
ing his American citizenship) became a minister 
in his father’s government. Most independent ob­
servers credited Andreas Papandreou as a man espe­
cially well suited to deal with the problems of eco­
nomic planning in Greece (he favored solutions along 
New Deal and Keynesian lines). Within the Center 
Union, he came to lead a group of reformers devoted 
to party organization and meaningful programs rath­
er than the traditional issueless politics.
Andreas Papandreou’s more fervent supporters saw 
him as a new force on the Greek political scene who 
had the skill and determination to move Greece into 
the modern world. His detractors, on the other hand, 
regarded him as a «parachutist» in politics who used 
his father’s position to escape a dead-end academic 
career. Moreover, they saw him as an unstable per­
sonality whose arrogance matched his ambitions for 
power. Both admirers and critics agreed that Andreas 
Papandreou was trying to change the traditional as­
sumptions of Greek politics. A perhaps neutral judge­
ment is that Andreas Papandreou was a man of un­
doubted ability who was not innocent of hubris. In any 
evaluation, his supposed involvement withthe«Aspida» 
conspirators became the cause célèbre which the tra­
ditional political system was incapable of handling.
the breakdown of democracy
The set of circumstances surrounding the breakdown 
of democracy in Greece was not without its ironies. 
The monarchy was designed to be a stabilizing force 
in the Greek political system; yet the King’s perform­
ance made a farce of the constitutional framework. 
George Papandreou came into office with a mandate 
unprecedented in Greek political history; yet his own 
intemperateness discredited the legitimacy of the po­
litical system he sought to govern. Andreas Papandre­
ou was seen by many as the herald of a new non-per- 
sonalistic style in Greek politics; yet it was around his 
personality that the parliamentary system foundered.
The Greek Right endlessly invoked the bogey of 
communist subversion; yet neither the parliamentary 
EDA nor the illegal KKE played any significant part 
in the combination of events and personalities which 
brought on the crisis de régime. The Greek Center 
sought to reform the armed forces by bringing it under 
parliamentary control; yet these efforts only pro­
voked the military into an even greater hostility toward 
civilian government. The Greek Left portrayed Greek 
politics as a coming conflict between the ruling class 
and the masses; yet the final denouement was more 
in the nature of a triumph of the provincial petty 
bourgeoisie over the Athenian haut monde.
If the analysis of the breakdown of Greek parlia­
mentary democracy herein presented appears to over-
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stress personal and volitional factors rather than broad 
cultural and structural determinants, this in fact 
corresponds with my own comprehension of what 
happened. But such a premise also serves the didactic 
purpose of partially redressing the extant commen­
tary which too easily invokes impersonalistic expla­
nations. This is not to say that political sociological 
variables are irrelevant—and I have consciously 
sought not to slight them; but it is to say that such 
variables set only vague parameters within which in­
dividual acts have decisive consequences. Certainly 
in the collapse of parliamentary democracy in Greece, 
the actions of only a few figures operating within a 
narrowing political arena were themselves of a de­
termining quality.
The formal end of Greek democracy came dramati­
cally on April 21, 1967. But the actions of the protago­
nists on the Greek political scene over the preceding 
two years had already drained the parliamentary sys­
tem of its vitality. The military takeover was as much 
coup de grâce as it was coup d'état.
NOTES
1. Indeed, a counter set of equally plausible ex post facto 
propositions could be raised to argue that the Greece of the 
mid-1960’s possessed certain unique advantages for the success 
of parliamentary democracy: Greece in early 1967 had a per 
capita income of over $700 US, a figure well into the top 
quartile of the world’s national economies; during the years 
1963 through 1966, the GNP increased at an average of 8.0 
per cent annually in real terms, one of the highest advances 
in the world; the distribution of national income in Greece 
appeared to be no more skewed toward the upper classes than 
in other Western societies; property ownership in rural areas 
was almost entirely in the hands of small-and medium-sized 
farmers; both agricultural underemployment and urban un­
employment had been markedly reduced between 1958 and 
1967. See, Greece Annual Supplement, 1968, London: the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 1968; Concise Statistical Year­
book of Greece, 1967, Athens: National Statistical Service of 
Greece, 1968; and Postwar European Incomes, New York: 
United Nations Publications, 1970.
Neither were factors on the political scene all that inaus­
picious for the stability of a parliamentary regime: a remark­
ably free press had developed in Greece since the early 1950’s; 
a strong tradition of local government at the village level had 
endured since the Ottoman period; at the national level, parlia­
mentary elections were increasingly free and non-coercive. 
Very significantly, it must be remembered that the 1963-64 
Greek elections were the first time since World War II that a 
single strong and coherent party had ousted another such party 
by a decisive victory at the polls in all of continental Europe.
It should also be stressed that contemporary Greece is an 
exceptionally homogeneous society, almost entirely free of inter­
religious conflict, ethnic cleavage, or regional separatism.
2. A detailed exposition of the conceptual approach used 
in this case study of Greek parliamentary democracy is given 
in Juan J. Linz, «The Breakdown of Competitive Democracies: 
Elements for a Model», paper presented at the Seventh World 
Congress of Sociology, Varna, September, 1970. Linz argues 
that conventional reliance on political sociological variables 
forces a too deterministic explanation of political phenomena; 
at the least, equal attention ought be given to those volitional
acts occurring in a narrow political arena which have decisive 
consequences for the maintenance or collapse of parliamentary 
regimes.
3. The Greek government rashly tried to implement the 
1919 Treaty of Sèvres (signed but never ratified by the major 
powers) which ceded Eastern Thrace, Smyrna, and an Asia 
Minor enclave to Greece. Following the Greek defeat, the 
Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 provided for a massive population 
exchange between Greece and Turkey. Although ending a 
3,000-year-long Greek presence in Asia Minor, the transfer of 
populations created an ethnically homogeneous Greek nation.
4. The negotiations between the government and the com­
munists were concluded in February, 1945, at Varkiza, outside 
Athens. The major provisions of the Varkiza Agreements were:
(1) a plebiscite to be held on the question of the King’s return;
(2) the holding of general elections following the plebiscite;
(3) the existence of a legal communist party and press; (4) 
EAM /ELAS to be demobilized; (5) political amnesty be given to 
EAM/ELAS leaders but leaving other resistance fighters sub­
ject to criminal prosecution. The last point was regarded by many 
as a betrayal by the communist leadership of their rank and file.
5. The Civil War victory of the government was not due 
solely to American intervention and Tito’s closing of the fron­
tier. There were also manifold failings within the communist 
insurgency: the Communist Party’s advocacy of an autonomous 
Macedonia impugned its Greek nationalism; there was a con­
tinuing expectation of Russian support which never came; the 
Greek communist leadership itself was bitterly faction ridden; 
the adoption of frontal military tactics was a blunder; the atroc­
ities committed by the insurgents at least equaled those of the 
government forces; there was a strategic misassumption of the 
Greek populace’s willingness to endure continued violence.
The definitive study of the Greek Civil War from a pro- 
government viewpoint is George D. Kousoulas, Revolution and 
Defeat, London: Oxford University Press, 1965. For an account 
sympathetic to the insurgent side (but bitterly critical of Stalinism) 
see, Dominique Eudes, Les Kapétanios, Paris: Fayard, 1970.
6. The standard work on American-Greek relations is The­
odore A. Coloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and 
NATO Influences, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
7. Markezinis is generally credited with being the architect 
of the «Greek economic miracle» through his influence on Pa- 
pagos’ and Karamanlis’ economic policies during the 1950’s.
8. Plastiras had served briefly as prime minister in late 
1944-early 1945. He was forced to resign by his refusal to adopt 
a belligerent stand against EAM /ELAS. During a second tenure 
as prime minister in 1950-51, Plastiras again favored a policy 
of compromise with the communists. Alone of the post-war 
prime ministers, Plastiras sought to implement a policy of re­
conciliation with the Left.
9. The Greek electoral system is complex and usually con­
structed to serve the party in power. The system in use since 
1956 was a type of «reinforced proportional representation». 
Three different kinds of constituencies were set up: (1) those 
with up to three members of parliament where all deputies 
came from the party winning an absolute majority; (2) those 
with between four and ten deputies where the party with the 
most votes got 70 per cent of the seat, the second party 30 per 
cent; and (3) those with more than ten deputies where a straight 
proportional system applied. Inasmuch as the smaller districts 
where in rural areas and the larger ones in the cities, the Right 
was likely to take all seats where it polled apopular majority while 
attaining proportional representation in constituencies where 
it was a minority. See, Keith R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece, 
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 143-144.
10. The right of the King to select a prime minister from 
other than the leader of the major parliamentary party had a 
modern precedent. Following Papagos’ death in 1955, King 
Paul bypassed senior leaders in the Greek Rally to chose the 
relatively unknown Karamanlis.
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11. This scheme has been attributed to Christos Lambrakis 
(no relation to the murdered EDA deputy of the same name), 
a press magnate of center-right political persuasion. The Lam­
brakis plan sought to isolate Andreas Papandreou by forcing 
him out of the Center Union into either EDA or his own left- 
liberal party. The elements of the Lambrakis plan were: (1) 
elections in late May 1970 under the Paraskevopoulos caretaker 
government; (2) George Papandreou abstains from an anti­
royalist campaign; (3) if the Center Union (presumably purged 
of its left faction) did not receive a parliamentary majority in 
the elections it forms a coalition with ERE; (4) George Papan­
dreou to be prime minister in the new parliament; (5) the King 
has the right to veto nominees to the Papandreou cabinet. See, 
Constantine Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy, Middlesex, Eng­
land: Penguin Books, 1969, pp. 199-203.
12. For a documentation of the social background and be­
liefs of Greek Army officers, see the empirical study of George 
A. Kourvetaris, «The Contemporary Army Officer Corps in 
Greece: An Inquiry into its Professionalism and Intervention­
ism», doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, North­
western University, 1969.
13. Although the full circumstances surrounding the «As- 
pida» affair may never be known, the following provisional 
judgement may be in order: that elements in the Center Union 
sought to infiltrate supporters into military positions seems 
definite; that such a group known as «Aspida» existed seems 
likely; that Andreas Papandreou was personally linked to this 
group seems doubtful; that persons in the Palace and Army 
would falsify evidence to link Andreas Papandreou with 
«Aspida» seems probable.
14. Similarly, much has been made of the ties of the leaders 
of the April 21 coup with KYP (the Greek Central Intelligence 
Agency) which in turn is defined as an arm of the American 
CIA. Less has been made of the fact that the left-wing «Aspida» 
conspiracy was also centered in KYP. On this point, see John 
Campbell and Philip Sherrard, Modern Greece, New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, p. 274.
15. Tsoucalas, op. cit., p. 207.
16. Papandreou’s opponents argued that salaried workers 
in 1965-66 were suffering from a price inflation for which the 
Center Union’s own economic policies were mainly responsible.
17. It is also plausible that as late as spring 1967, the King 
could have defused the political crisis with la grande geste of 
pardoning the convicted «Aspida» defendants.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Despite its recentness, the end of Greek democracy in the mid- 
1960’s has already become the subject of an impressive body 
of literature. Because of the controversial nature of the cir­
cumstances leading to the collapse of the parliamentary regime, 
the viewpoints and analyses are quite varied and often diamet­
rically opposed. Given below is an annotation of this literature 
couped with their authors’ attribution of the causes of the 
breakdown of parliamentary democracy in Greece.
Aujourd'hui la Grèce. Dossier, special issue of Les Temps 
Modernes, October, 1969.
Varied collection of essays on contemporary Greece. Basi­
cally a New Left critique which characterizes modern Greek 
politics as a succession of monarcho-fascist regimes. Break­
down attributed to repression of progressive forces and U.S. 
involvement in 1967 coup.
Jane P. C. Carey and Andrew G. Carey, The Web of Modern 
Greek Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.
A readable account of Greek politics from the War of 
Independence to the 1967 coup. Subtly pro-royalist. Breakdown 
attributed to diverse factors: historical instability of Greece,
activities of communists, failure of Papandreous (père et fils) 
to abide by rules of the fragile political system.
John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, Modern Greece, New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.
Promises to be the definitive study of modern Greece for 
many years to come. Thorough, scholarly, and non-partisan. 
Breakdown attributed to existence of efficient and well organ­
ized national army in context of deficient and malorganized 
political structures.
George A. Kourvetaris, «The Contemporary Army Officer 
Corps in Greece», doctoral dissertation, Department of Soci­
ology, Northwestern University, 1969.
Empirical documentation of class origins and social atti­
tudes of Greek Army officers in 1968. Analysis somewhat 
sympathetic to military government. Breakdown attributed to 
officer corps' fear of communist takeover, disgust withpclitical 
instability, and dread of growing moral and social decay inGreece.
Keith R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece, Stanford, Califor­
nia: Stanford University Press, 1969.
An excellent empirical documentation by a sophisticated 
political scientist of the issueless and patron-client bases of 
Greek politics. Breakdown primarily attributed to deficient po­
litical culture and incapacity of traditional political system to 
modernize itself.
Ministry to the Prime Minister, The Political Situation in Greece 
from 1944 to the Present, Athens: Press and Information De­
partment, 1969.
Representative of official statements periodically issued by 
the military government. Claims «history» will vindicate April 
21 «revolution». Breakdown attributed to threat of communist 
takeover and political incompetence of parliamentary leaders.
Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, New York: 
Doubleday, 1970.
Personal account by a leading protagonist on the Greek 
political scene. Self-serving but valuable for its inside com­
mentary on developments during the 1965-67 parliamentary 
crisis. Breakdown primarily attributed to perfidy of political 
opponents, and American collusion with anti-progressive forces.
Stephen Rousseas, The Death of a Democracy, New York: 
Grove Press, 1967.
The first book published on the 1967 coup. Subtitled «Greece 
and the American Conscience» it set pattern for left-liberal 
critique which exonerated Andreas Papandreou and attributed 
breakdown primarily to American collusion with anti-progres­
sive forces.
Constantine Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy, Middlesex, Eng­
land: Penguin Books, 1969.
A trenchant Marxist (but non-communist) analysis of Greek 
society and politics. Well written and well reasoned. Break­
down primarily attributed to unwillingness of vested intereststo 
countenance any change in bourgeois socio-economicstructures.
Helen Vlachos, House Arrest, London: Andre Deutsch, 1970.
Self-serving and personal account by Greece’s former leading 
conservative newspaper publisher. Worth reading because it re­
presents a vie wpoint that i s both right-wing and anti-junta. Break­
down primarily attributed to power seeking of boorish colonels.
Kenneth Young, The Greek Passion, London: 1969.
Professedly biased but important because it is only full- 
length defense of the 1967 coup and the military regime. Break­
down attributed to Greek historical proclivities toward political 
instability compounded by personality of Andreas Papandreou 
and threat of communist takeover.
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